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Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of secure and private distributed matrix multiplication. Specifically, we focus
on a scenario where a user wants to compute the product of a confidential matrix A, with a matrix Bθ , where
θ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. The set of candidate matrices {B1, . . . , BM} are public, and available at all the N servers. The
goal of the user is to distributedly compute ABθ , such that (a) no information is leaked about the matrix A to
any server; and (b) the index θ is kept private from each server. Our goal is to understand the fundamental tradeoff
between the upload vs download cost for this problem. Our main contribution is to show that the lower convex hull
of following (upload, download) pairs: (U,D) = (N/(K − 1), (K/(K − 1))(1 + (K/N) + · · · + (K/N)M−1))
for K = 2, . . . , N is achievable. The scheme improves upon state-of-the-art existing schemes for this problem, and
leverages ideas from secret sharing and coded private information retrieval.
Keywords – Distributed Matrix Multiplication, Secure Matrix Multiplication, Private Information Retrieval.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed computing aims at speeding up computationally intensive operations by dividing and outsourcing
the computation to multiple servers. Distributed processing often comes with additional communication overhead,
when compared to centralized processing. Furthermore, when processing sensitive information in a distributed
manner, security and privacy are also critical concerns. Hence, simultaneously utilizing distributed processing,
while satisfying security/privacy constraints are critical and of great interest.
A well known issue in distributed systems is the straggler effect, where slower machines in the system slow down
the entire computation. Recently, error control codes have been successfully adopted to carefully add computational
redundancy in order to tackle the stragglers problem. For instance, entangled polynomial codes [1] and PolyDot
codes [2] have been proposed for the stragglers problem, within the context of distributed matrix multiplication.
Although mitigating stragglers is important, it is crucial to ensure that the data, if confidential, is not leaked to
unauthorized servers. Recently, another line of research has focused on the security aspects for the distributed matrix
multiplication problem. Secure matrix-vector multiplication was considered in [3]. In [4], the authors considered
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Fig. 1: System model for secure and private matrix multiplication: multiply a confidential matrix A with Bθ , while keeping the
index θ private from all N servers.
a variation of the problem where the matrices are kept secure against the servers as well as the user. The authors
in [5] proposed the idea of Lagrange coded computing that simultaneously deals with straggler, colluding servers
and malicious servers. Later, [6], [7] studied the problem of secure distributed matrix multiplication. Both works
proposed schemes based on polynomial codes, where the authors of [7] studied the non-colluding version of the
problem and the authors of [6] studied the colluding version (also see recent improvements and variants in [8]–[11]).
Another issue that needs to be addressed is privacy of the user. Consider a scenario where in addition to the
confidential data, the queries sent for computation are also sensitive, i.e., the queries can leak private information
about the user. The authors of [12] considered both security and privacy for the problem of distributed matrix
multiplication. There are several other works that have focused primarily on the privacy aspect. In particular,
starting from the work of [13], private information retrieval (PIR) has been studied extensively within an information
theoretic framework (such as PIR from coded databses [14] and private computation [15]–[18]).
Main Contributions: In this paper, we focus on the model where a user wants to compute the product of a
confidential matrix A, with a matrix Bθ, where θ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. The set of candidate matrices {B1, . . . , BM} are
public, and available at all the N servers. The goal of the user is to distributedly compute ABθ, such that (a)
no information is leaked about the matrix A to any server; and (b) the index θ is kept private from each server.
Our main contribution is to show that the lower convex hull of following (upload, download) pairs: (U,D) =
(N/(K − 1), (K/(K − 1))(1 + (K/N) + · · · + (K/N)M−1)) for K = 2, . . . , N is achievable. Our scheme also
improves upon the scheme of [12].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a distributed system with one user and N non-colluding servers. The user has a confidential matrix
A ∈ Fd1×d2 , and all servers have access to M matrices Bm ∈ Fd2×d3 , m = 1, . . . ,M , for some integers d1, d2 and
d3, and a sufficiently large field F. We assume that the matrices A,B1, · · · , BM are all independent of each other,
and each with i.i.d. entries from F. The goal of the user is to compute the product of a confidential matrix A with Bθ,
where the index θ is private. Each server is connected to the user through a separate link. We assume that all servers
are honest but curious (i.e., all servers correctly follow the protocols, however, they are interested in learning about
A and θ). To ensure security, the user securely encodes A using encoding functions f = (f1, . . . , fN ), where fn is
the individual encoding function for server n. We denote the encoded version of A that is sent to server n by A˜n,
3i.e., A˜n = fn(A). Along with A˜n, the user also sends a query Q
(θ)
n to server n. Without any prior knowledge of the
stored data, the queries sent by the user are independent of all the Bm’s, i.e., I(Q
(θ)
1 , . . . , Q
(θ)
N ;B1, . . . , BM ) = 0.
Each server n uses a computing function Z(θ)n : {B1, . . . , BM} × A˜n ×Q(θ)n → Z(θ)n for the assigned task. Once
servers finish the requested computations, servers return their answers Z(θ)n , n = 1, . . . , N, to the user. Next, to
preserve the privacy of the user, the strategy the user used to download the desired result should not reveal θ. That
is, for any θ and θ′, the query and the answer from server n should be statistically identical. Upon receiving all
the Z(θ)n ’s, the user decodes the desired result by using decoding function, ABθ = g(Z
(θ)
1 , Q
(θ)
1 , . . . , Z
(θ)
N , Q
(θ)
N ).
A scheme is secure, private and reliable if it satisfies the following constraints:
Security Constraint:
I(A; A˜n, Q
(θ)
n , B1, . . . , BM ) = 0, n = 1, . . . , N. (1)
Privacy Constraint:
(A˜n, Q
(θ)
n , Z
(θ)
n , B[1:M ]) ∼ (A˜n, Q(θ
′)
n , Z
(θ′)
n , B[1:M ]),∀n (2)
Decodability Constraint:
H
(
ABθ|Z(θ)1 , Q(θ)1 , · · · , Z(θ)N , Q(θ)N
)
= 0. (3)
The performance of a scheme is determined by the normalized upload cost (U) and download cost (D), defined
as:
U =
N∑
n=1
H(A˜n)
H(ABθ)
, and D =
N∑
n=1
H(Z
(θ)
n )
H(ABθ)
. (4)
Our aim is to understand the tradeoff between the upload and download costs, i.e., the set of all feasible (U,D)
pairs. The optimal download cost for a fixed upload cost is defined as:
D∗(U) , min{D : (U,D) is feasible}. (5)
The following Lemma shows that the optimal download cost is a convex function of the upload cost.
Lemma 1. The optimal download cost D∗(U) is a convex function of the upload cost U .
Proof: To prove this Lemma, we show that for any two upload costs U1, U2 and their corresponding optimal
download costs D∗(U1), D∗(U2), there is a scheme with upload cost U¯ = αU1 + (1 − α)U2 that achieves a
download cost of D¯ = αD∗(U1) + (1− α)D∗(U2), 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This can be shown by memory sharing argument
where we partition A into two parts, A(α) ∈ Fαd1×d2 and A(1−α) ∈ F(1−α)d1×d2 , respectively. A(α) is sent to
servers securely using scheme 1 with upload cost U1. The answers are returned to the user using the optimal scheme
that corresponds to U1, hence, achieves the download cost of D∗(U1). Similarly, A(1−α) is sent to servers and the
answers are returned to the user using scheme 2 that achieves (U2, D∗(U2)). The desired results obtained from
4both parts are of size αd1 × d3 and (1 − α)d1 × d3. Since these are per-bit costs, the total upload and download
costs are
Utotal = αU1d1d2 + (1− α)U2d1d2 = U¯d1d2, (6)
Dtotal = αD
∗(U1)d1d3 + (1− α)D∗(U2)d1d3 = D¯d1d3. (7)
Clearly, the optimal D∗(U¯) is upper bounded by D¯(U¯) completing the proof of Lemma 1.
In the next proposition, we show that even without any privacy constraints, the minimum upload cost is N/(N−1).
Proposition 1. The minimum value of upload cost is Umin = N/(N − 1).
Proof: We start with the following sequence of inequalities:
N∑
n=1
H(A˜n) ≥ H(A˜1, . . . , A˜N )
(a)
= H(A˜1, . . . , A˜N |B1, . . . , BM )
(b)
= H(ABθ, A˜1, . . . , A˜N |B1, . . . , BM )
= H(ABθ|B1, . . . , BM ) +H(A˜1, . . . , A˜N |ABθ, B1, . . . , BM )
(c)
≥ H(ABθ) +H(A˜n|ABθ, B1, . . . , BM )
(d)
= H(ABθ) +H(A˜n|B1, . . . , BM )
(e)
= H(ABθ) +H(A˜n) (8)
where (a) follows from the fact that A˜n’s are independent of Bm’s for all m,n; (b) follows from decodability
constraint; (c) is due to the fact that H(ABθ|B1, . . . , BM ) = H(ABθ) by security constraint; (d) also follows
from security constraint and the fact that A,B1, . . . , BM are all independent of each other so that ABθ can be
removed from the conditioning; (e) follows due to independence of A˜n and {B1, . . . , BM}. Summing up (8) for
all n, we have N(
∑N
n=1H(A˜n)) ≥ NH(ABθ) +
∑N
n=1H(A˜n). By rearranging, we obtain
U =
∑N
n=1H(A˜n)
H(ABθ)
≥ N
N − 1 , (9)
completing the proof of Proposition 1.
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Fig. 2: Comparison between our proposed scheme and the scheme in [12], with N = 12,M = 6 and K = 2, 3, . . . , 12.
III. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Theorem 1. For the secure and private matrix multiplication problem with N non-colluding servers, where each
server has access to M public matrices, the lower convex hull of
(U,D) =
(
N
K − 1 ,
K
K − 1
(
1 +
K
N
+ · · ·+
(
K
N
)M−1))
for K = 2, . . . , N is achievable.
Remark 1. In Theorem 1, by varying the parameter K, we can trade off upload cost for download cost. We note
that for minimum upload cost, i.e., when K = N and U = N/(N − 1), and M = 1 (i.e., no privacy constraint),
the download cost of D = N/(N − 1) is information-theoretically optimal as shown in our previous work [6].
Remark 2. We compare our scheme to the scheme in [12]. For any two integers (m1,m2), the scheme in [12] uses
N = (m1+1)(m2+1) servers to achieve a lower convex hull of (U,D) = (N/m1, N/m1m2). In the simulation, we
let N = 12,M = 6 and K = 2, . . . , 12 for our proposed scheme. We used (m1,m2) = (1, 5), (2, 3), (3, 2), (5, 1)
for the scheme in [12] to ensure that N = 12. The scheme in [12] essentially achieves (U,D) = (N/(K −
1), (K/(K − 1))(N/(N − K))) for K = 2, 3, 4, 6 in this example. In Fig. 2, we compare the proposed scheme
of this paper with that in [12]. We next make the following observations: for the same upload cost, the download
cost of the proposed scheme is smaller. Furthermore, there are several (U,D) pairs that the scheme in [12] cannot
achieve, particularly for smaller values of upload cost.
A. Illustrative Example: (N = 4,M = 2,K = 3)
We next demonstrate the proposed achievable scheme through an example to illustrate the main ideas. Suppose
there are N = 4 non-colluding servers and each server has access to all M = 2 matrices, namely B1 and B2,
whose dimensions are all d2× d3. Assume that the user wants to compute AB1, and the index θ = 1 must be kept
private. The user first partitions the matrix A into A = [AT1 A
T
2 ]
T , where each Ai is of size (d1/2)× d2, i = 1, 2.
6The desired computation AB1 becomes AB1 = [(A1B1)T (A2B1)T ]T . To provide security, Ai’s are encoded using
a secure (N,K) = (4, 3) MDS code as follows:
A˜n = A1 +A2xn +Rx
2
n, n = 1, . . . , 4, (10)
where R ∈ F(d1/2)×d2 is a random matrix (independent of A), whose entries are i.i.d. uniform random variables,
and xn is a distinct element in F assigned to server n. The user then sends A˜n to server n and instructs them to
multiply their respective A˜n with all Bm’s. Specifically, each server n computes
A˜nBm = A1Bm +A2Bmxn +RBmx
2
n, m = 1, 2. (11)
To simplify the notation, we let hTnW
(m) , A˜nBm, where
hn =

1
xn
x2n
 , W (m) =

A1Bm
A2Bm
RBm
 . (12)
Due to the properties of the (4, 3) MDS code, we need at least three different hTnW
(m) (viewed as three evaluations
of a polynomial) to decode the desired result W (1) whose components can then be used to recover AB1 (via
polynomial interpolation).
However, only downloading hTnW
(1) from any three servers will clearly violate the privacy constraint. Thus, to
retrieve the answers while preserving privacy, we adopt a similar downloading strategy for the PIR problem with
coded databases in [14]. The user asks each server n to divide each hTnW
(m), m = 1, 2 into NM = 42 = 16 blocks
vertically, i.e.,
hTnW
(m) =

hTnW
(m)
1
...
hTnW
(m)
16
 ,∀n,m. (13)
Note that each block is composed of rows of the results, each one of which is coded using (4, 3) MDS code.
The privacy preserving download scheme is broken into repetitions and rounds. Within each repetition, there are
M = 2 rounds, and there are a total of K = 3 repetitions. In Repetition 1, Round 1, the user downloads 3 blocks
of the desired computation W (1) from each server, i.e., hT1W
(1)
[1:3] from server 1, h
T
2W
(1)
[4:6] from server 2 and so on.
To maintain privacy, the user needs to download equivalent amount of blocks of the undesired computation W (2).
In order to utilize the undesired blocks, the user needs to be able to decode the undesired blocks. Hence, the user
downloads hT1W
(2)
1 , h
T
2W
(2)
1 and h
T
3W
(2)
1 from server 1, 2 and 3, respectively; downloads h
T
4W
(2)
2 , h
T
1W
(2)
2 and
hT2W
(2)
2 from server 4, 1 and 2 respectively, and so on, until all W
(2)
[1:4] can be decoded (see Table 3).
In Round 2, we pair up a new block of W (1) and a undesired block of W (2) decoded from Round 1 and let the
user download the sum of them. Since the user has not downloaded W (2)4 from server 1, the user can ask server
1 to send hT1W
(2)
4 + h
T
1W
(1)
13 . Similarly, the user can ask server 2 to send h
T
2W
(2)
3 + h
T
2W
(1)
14 and so on. Clearly,
the user can use W (2)[1:4] from Round 1 as side information to obtain h
T
1W
(1)
13 , h
T
2W
(1)
14 , h
T
3W
(1)
15 and h
T
4W
(1)
16 . In
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Fig. 3: Downloading strategy for (N = 4,M = 2,K = 3).
Repetition 1, the user ends up downloading all the blocks of W (1) once (12 from Round 1, and 4 from Round 2). In
order to decode W (1), the user needs to download all 16 blocks two more times with different linear combinations.
Thus, the user can follow the same downloading pattern with a right shift of indices in Repetition 2 and one more
shift in Repetition 3 with new side information. The normalized upload and download costs of the scheme are given
by U = 4/(3 − 1) = 2 and D = (3 × 28)/(2 × 16) = 21/8 per bit. We next describe the general scheme in the
following section.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We now present the achievable scheme, which can be broken into two phases: (1) secure upload; and (2) private
download.
8Phase 1 (Secure Upload): Assume that the user wants to compute ABθ, θ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. For a given parameter
K, the user first divides the input matrix A into K−1 partitions vertically into A = [AT1 . . . ATK−1]T , where each
Ai is of size d1/(K − 1)× d2. The goal can be written as
ABθ =

A1Bθ
...
AK−1Bθ
 . (14)
The confidential matrix A is encoded as follows:
A˜n =
K−1∑
i=1
Aix
i−1
n +Rx
K−1
n (15)
for server n, where R is a random matrix with the same dimension as any Ai, with uniformly distributed i.i.d.
entries, and xn is a distinct element in F assigned to server n. The user uploads A˜n to server n and instructs each
server to multiply their respective A˜n with all the Bm’s, i.e.,
A˜nBm =
K−1∑
i=1
AiBmx
i−1
n +RBmx
K−1
n , ∀m, (16)
which can be written as hTnW
(m), where
hn =

1
xn
...
xK−1n
 , W
(m) =

A1Bm
...
AK−1Bm
RBm
 . (17)
It is clear that total normalized upload cost is U = N/(K − 1).
Phase 2 (Private Download): We use a similar downloading technique that was proposed in [14]. Thus, before the
user downloads anything from servers, the user first asks each server n to partition the results A˜nBm into blocks
as follows
hTnW
(m) =

hTnW
(m)
1
...
hTnW
(m)
NM
 ,∀m, (18)
where each block is of size d1/(NM (K − 1))× d3. The user organizes the download into repetitions and rounds.
Within each repetition, there are M rounds, and there are a total of K repetitions. Since the download pattern in
each repetition is a cyclic shift of the previous repetition, we focus on describing the details of rounds.
In Round i = 1 of Repetition 1, the user downloads KM−1 desired blocks from each server, where the user
downloads hTnW
(θ)
(n−1)KM−1+1, . . . , h
T
nW
(θ)
nKM−1 from server n,∀n. A total of NKM−1 distinct desired blocks are
downloaded in this step. However, in order to ensure privacy, the user needs to enforce message symmetry. In
other words, the user needs to download equal number of blocks of each undesired computation hTnW
(m), m =
1, . . . ,M,m 6= θ from server n. While undesired, these blocks can be used as side information in the next round.
9To ensure that the undesired blocks can be used as side information, the user needs to be able to decode those
undesired blocks, i.e., obtain W (m)j for some j and m 6= θ. Since each block is encoded using (N,K) MDS code,
the user needs to download each hTnW
(m)
j from at least K different servers, for a fixed m 6= θ and j. The user
can choose to download hTnW
(m)
jp
from server n = K(p − 1) + 1, . . . ,Kp mod N and p = 1, . . . , NKM−2 for
all m 6= θ. Note that if n mod N = 0, we set that n to N . Since each hTnW (m)jp is downloaded from K servers,
the user is able to decode W (m)jp . Hence, the user can cancel the contribution of any W
(m)
jp
in the subsequent
rounds. In general, in any given Round i, the user downloads hTn′W
(m1)
`1
+ hTn′W
(m2)
`2
+ · · · + hTn′W (mi)`i , where
n′ = n, . . . , n + K − 1, m1, . . . ,mi ∈ {1, . . . ,M}\θ and `1, . . . , `i ∈ {1, . . . , NM}. Thus, the amount of side
information available at the user is N
(
M−1
i
)
KM−i−1(N −K)i−1.
Since for a particular block of side information, there are N − K servers who did not download that block,
we can pair that block with a fresh desired block at those N − K servers. Starting from Round i + 1, the user
downloads the sums of i+ 1 blocks from different computations with the help of side information from last round.
The user downloads a fresh block of hTnW
(θ) and i blocks of side information decoded from last round, i.e.,
hTnW
(θ)
r1 + h
T
nW
(m1)
`1
+ · · ·+ hTnW (mi)`i , where r1 is the new block of W (θ) from server n. This allows the user to
obtain N
(
M−1
i
)
KM−i−1(N −K)i fresh desired blocks.
The user can repeat this process K times except the indices for desired blocks are shifted right once in
every repetition and fresh indices are chosen for side information in every repetition. Since each desired block
is downloaded K times from K different source, the user can easily decode W (θ), hence, recover ABθ. This
allows the user to download a total of K
∑M−1
i=1 N
(
M−1
i
)
KM−i(N − K)i−1 undesired blocks and a total of
K
∑M−1
i=0 N
(
M−1
i
)
KM−i−1(N − K)i desired blocks. Note that each desired block has K terms, however, only
K − 1 of those terms are actually useful due to the addition of the random matrix (for ensuring confidentiality of
the matrix A). Hence, the download cost for this scheme is
D =
total downloaded
K−1
K × total desired
=
K
K − 1
(
1 +
total undesired
total desired
)
=
K
K − 1
(
1 +
K
∑M−1
i=1 N
(
M−1
i
)
KM−i(N −K)i−1
K
∑M−1
i=0 N
(
M−1
i
)
KM−i−1(N −K)i
)
=
K
K − 1
(
1 +
K
N−K
∑M−1
i=1
(
M−1
i
)
KM−1−i(N −K)i
NM−1
)
=
K
K − 1
(
1 +
K
N−K
(
NM−1 −KM−1)
NM−1
)
=
K
K − 1
(
1 +
K
N −K
(
1−
(
K
N
)M−1))
=
K
K − 1
(
N −K(KN )M−1
N −K
)
=
K
K − 1
(
1− (KN )M
1− KN
)
,
which leads to the expression of the normalized download cost D in Theorem 1. This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
10
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the problem of secure and private matrix multiplication. We proposed a new scheme
that combines ideas from secret sharing and coded PIR. We showed that the lower convex hull of (U,D) =
(N/(K − 1), (K/(K − 1))(1 + (K/N) + · · ·+ (K/N)M−1)) for K = 2, . . . , N is achievable. We also show that
our scheme performs better than the scheme proposed in [12] in terms of upload and download cost. An interesting
future direction is to obtain converse results for the tradeoff between upload/download cost for this problem.
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